The September SEiR-F session is a series of presentations for faculty who have received grants through the SEiR-F program. Each presentation will last 30 minutes followed by 15 minutes for
The September SEiR-F session is a series of presentations for faculty who have received grants through the SEiR-F program. Each presentation will last 30 minutes followed by 15 minutes for questions. Light snacks will be served immediately afterward.
1. Peter Magnusson & Stanford Westjohn
Presentation: Trust Propensity across Cultures: Effects of Individualist and Collectivist Values
Does individualism – collectivism influence an individual’s willingness to trust others? Grounded in social projection theory, we find evidence that collectivism influences an individual’s propensity to trust, mediated by a perceived collectivism consensus. Study 1 establishes correlational evidence between societal-level collectivism and individual-level trust propensity with results from a multi-level analysis of data from over 6,000 respondents in 36 different countries. Study 2 contributes causal evidence at the individual level based on experiments in both the US and China. We prime independent versus interdependent self-construal and isolate the mechanism, perceived collectivism consensus, through which one’s own collectivism value influences trust. Finally, Study 3 identifies a boundary condition and examines the extent to which values are projected onto in-group versus out-group members, and the subsequent effect on trust propensity.
2. Matt Van Essen
Presentation: Fair Allocations in the Assignment Problem
The assignment problem is concerned with how to best assign N different items to N different agents. It is a fundamental problem in combinatorial optimization with natural applications in economics and operations research. In this paper we introduce a “balanced price” algorithm for solving the assignment problem. We show that this algorithm essentially defines a dynamic auction for solving assignment problems when items are commonly owned. Our main result is that if bidders use “reasonable” bidding strategies, then the auction’s allocation will be both efficient and envy free (i.e., fair).
3. Subha Chakraborti
Presentation: Control Charts for Statistical Process Monitoring in Some Nonstandard Situations
Process monitoring with control charts is considered for the balanced random effects model under normality. Our methodology takes account of the randomness of the batches, the effects of parameter estimation with retrospective data and uses the appropriate metric to design the chart. In Phase I, a Shewhart X ̅ chart is proposed and designed for a specified false alarm probability (FAP). The required charting constants are derived and tabulated. Illustrations are provided with data. Performance of the chart is examined in terms of robustness and out-of-control shift detection ability. Various generalizations and works in-progress are briefly indicated.
(Friday) 2:00 pm - 4:00 pm CST
361 Stadium Drive
Research at Culverhouserad@culverhouse.ua.edu